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tested plans, the percentage growth in options also
declines. So, on one level, boards appear to hear
shareholders’ message. However, CEO pay does
not decline; only its growth rate declines. Among
the 40 most contested options plans, the value of
new option grants still grew by almost 40 percent.
This is considerably less than the 140 percent
growth in options that sparked the initial shareholder revolts, but some might argue that the level
of board restraint is less than what many shareholders had hoped.
A limitation of Martin and Thomas’ study is
that it provides only a one-year snapshot at a
time when the stock market was growing rapidly. Perhaps in a post-techbubble, post-Enron
scandal world, shareholder reaction to dilutive
plans might be stronger and apply to more
plans. The average no vote was 19 percent in
1998 among the 156 plans for which Martin and
Thomas have complete data. By 2004, the average no vote had reached 25 percent, and
seven plans (versus four in 1998) were defeated
outright. Today, the effect of shareholder anger
might also translate into greater consequences
in the CEO’s next pay period. Recent regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley might strengthen
boards seeking to respond to shareholder criticism.
The main message of Martin and Thomas is
that, while some types of stock option plans
hurt shareholders, boards seek to correct their
mistakes by subsequently reducing the growth
rate of CEO pay. Shareholders need to be most
concerned about option plans that go only to
executives and dilute the stock more than 5
percent. Boards and CEOs should be aware that
proposing such plans will negatively affect share
prices in the short run and later draw protest
votes. Boards will feel pressure to respond by
holding the line on future CEO pay. If Martin
and Thomas are right, perhaps boards are finally
starting to get the message.
Source: Martin, K. J., & Thomas, R. S. 2005. When is
enough, enough? Market reaction to highly dilutive stock
option plans and the subsequent impact on CEO compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11: 61– 83.
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itigation against companies has existed as long
as businesses have competed. From the Dodge
brothers’ lawsuit compelling Ford to declare a
dividend to shareholders, to more recent examples
such as patent litigation against Blackberry-maker
Research in Motion and product liability claims
against Merck for its Vioxx drug, stock markets
have reacted to these lawsuits. Regardless of who
the plaintiffs are (e.g., government entities, other
firms, individuals) and whether or not the actions
stem from civil or criminal law, markets adjust a
company’s stock price for the effect of litigation
on company profitability. Indeed, numerous studies conclude that the filing of a lawsuit against a
company is always accompanied by a negative
reaction from stock markets.
To most executives, the idea that litigation is
bad for business and that settling is better than
going to trial may seem common sense. The explosive popularity of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) to resolve business disputes is attributable
to the desire of most companies to avoid public
disclosure and expensive litigation. Conventional
wisdom suggests that companies avoid litigation
because of the length of time involved, the high
cost, the public disclosure of intellectual property
or embarrassing secrets, and the destruction it
wreaks on existing business relationships. If this
wisdom is true, then stock markets should react
positively when a company short-circuits the litigation process and settles. In essence, settling
should be seen as a sign that management is removing a distraction to achieving company goals.
However, research finds that companies that
settle litigation actually tend to be punished by
stock markets. A new study by Bruce Haslem of
Florida State University about how markets react
to settlements and judgments was designed to find
out why. Moreover, prior research also suggests
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that when companies refuse to settle and instead
take on litigation, they are rewarded by markets,
even when they lose the case. Why these two seemingly contradictory phenomena occur has tremendously important significance for senior management. Haslem’s theory, and one largely supported
by his findings, is that agency costs are the explanation. In essence, he argues that conventional
thinking is flawed because it assumes that the
plaintiff and defendant in a case always act optimally and with perfect information—settlement
occurs when defendants believe that their chances
of losing at trial are greater than winning. Haslem’s study has much to teach us about the inherent conflicts that exist when managers act selfishly instead of in the shareholder’s best interests.
But first, it is important to understand that the
term “agency costs” is used to describe the tension
that exists between managers (the agents) and
shareholders (the principals). Shareholders always
seek to maximize share appreciation. Managers,
on the other hand, are often motivated by various
perks (e.g., non-cash compensation), career advancement, and executing a strategy. Sometimes,
managers also want to avoid information becoming public to shareholders. This “skeleton in the
closet” information may reflect poor decisions on
behalf of management, and if made public, could
result in adverse employment actions against the
manager. To the extent that managers take corporate actions based on these factors (other than
share price appreciation), agency costs exist.
Haslem theorizes that the more a manager
stands to lose in litigation and wants to keep
certain information from becoming public, the
harsher the market reaction to a settlement announcement. As a corollary to this first question,
Haslem also explores whether there is a relationship between the existence of information a manager wants to keep private and the speed at which
settlement is reached following litigation. If such a
relationship exists, it suggests that shareholders
should be suspicious when litigation is quickly
settled by a company. In these situations, active
shareholders may wish to seek further explanation
from management about the nature of the information being hidden.
Haslem conducted his research using a comput-
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erized database of federal district court filings. The
cases he studied were filed between 1994 and
1998, and covered suits based on antitrust, breach
of contract, product liability, labor, patent infringement, and derivative shareholder actions.
He only studied firms that were publicly listed,
and eliminated suits that later consolidated into
class-action suits, involved a foreign parent company, or could not be tracked to a final determination. All told, Haslem examined 965 specific
events, making his study the most comprehensive
thus far. In addition, Haslem examined specific
characteristics of defendant firms. These characteristics included number of shareholders, percentage of shares held by insiders, free cash flow,
CEO salary, managerial options, number of directors, percentage of inside directors, director compensation, and whether the CEO and board chairperson were the same individual.
Haslem’s study resulted in several important
findings. First, he found a significant negative
reaction to the settlement announcement of
litigation. This finding confirms the results of
previous research, but on a much larger scale.
Haslem also found that firms that chose settlement continued to under-perform in the market
for up to one year following settlement. Conversely, Haslem found that the average market
reaction to a judgment, regardless of whether
the defendant company won or lost the case,
was positive. Haslem believes that the explanation is simple. If firms have high agency costs,
shareholders would prefer that a case advance
all the way to trial. Even if the companies lose,
shareholders gain valuable information about
the quality of management.
Another key finding of the study is that the
timing of a settlement is very much affected by the
strength of two key measures of corporate governance—board composition and the ownership
structure of the firm. Settlements tend to occur
sooner when companies have a higher percentage
of insiders on their boards, have larger boards, and
have the same person serving as both CEO and
board chair. Haslem believes that these factors
paint the management of these firms as being less
subject to the monitoring of their actions. Consequently, these firms prefer to settle litigation ear-
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lier to protect management—ostensibly because
they have more to hide.
Finally, Haslem concludes that there are certain aspects of agency costs that can indicate how
markets react to certain settlements. If management holds a large portion of a firm’s equity, if
more of a firm’s equity is held by large shareholders, or if the firm pays dividends and aligns management compensation with shareholders by
granting stock options, then markets tend to react
more positively to settlements. On the other
hand, if the CEO is also the board chair, if there
are high fixed salaries for the CEO, and if the firm
has higher levels of free cash flow, then market
reaction to settlements is more negative. These
results largely confirm that agency costs play a
major role in determining market reaction to settlements. When management is seen as more
transparent to shareholders, markets tend to be
less punishing compared to when management is
considered to be more opaque.
Haslem’s research raises some important questions. Clearly, the most immediate impact of his
research is to demonstrate that financial markets
are very concerned about agency costs when a firm
settles litigation. Agency problems may result in
management making poor decisions on settlement, including settling too early—or for too
much money—in order to protect their own personal interests. Beyond this, Haslem’s study once
again raises questions about the duties of company
management. Under state law, officers and directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation itself
and to the shareholders of the corporation. Haslem’s research indicates that the market is skeptical, at best, about whether this duty is practiced
on a practical level. The fiduciary duty of officers
and directors must be real, not theoretical, to
provide markets with the confidence needed to
make assessments of a company’s performance.
Furthermore, Haslem’s study indicates the need
for legislators, once again, to consider extending
the fiduciary duty to all management, and not just
officers and directors.
Corporate governance and shareholder activism
have enjoyed a renaissance in the wake of Enron,
Tyco, and other high-profile corporate scandals. The
malfeasance of a few has brought newfound atten-
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tion to the motivations of management—especially
senior management—everywhere. This study sheds
new light on the tension between management and
shareholders’ interests when resolving litigation. For
management, the lesson from Haslem’s research is
straightforward. The markets are sophisticated
enough to realize that quick settlements are often a
sign of bad management seeking to restrain information from becoming public. When management settles lawsuits for reasons other than an optimal outcome based on costs and benefit, management
should realize that markets and shareholders are
watching their moves closely. Settlement may end
litigation, but it also may be only the beginning
when it comes to tough questions that management
has to answer.
Source: Haslem, B. 2005. Managerial opportunism during corporate litigation. Journal of Finance, 60(4): 2013–2041.
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oday, companies are undergoing important corporate governance transformations. Much of
this effort is in response to the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley, one of the most comprehensive
and stringent pieces of legislation in the history of
corporate governance. Additional restrictions
have been imposed by NASDAQ and the NYSE
that parallel Sarbanes-Oxley. These restrictions
require company boards to maintain a majority of
independent directors, hold meetings without
management present, and develop codes of ethics.
Firms are also aware of the increased consequences
for ethical lapses given the severe sentencing of
the CEOs of large companies such as Tyco and
WorldCom. Lastly, institutional activists continue to pressure firms to change their corporate
governance practices.

